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I. INTRODUCTION
ANE Doe takes a job with Technology. She signs an employment
contract that includes confidentiality and non-disclosure provisions.
Two years later, Jane decides to leave when a local start-up, Telecom,
makes her a lucrative offer. Instead of giving her two weeks, Technology
tells Jane that her new job violates her employment contract. Since Jane
knows Technology's trade secrets and Telecom is a competitor, she can-
not perform her duties for Telecom without inevitably disclosing Technol-
ogy's confidential information. Thus, the only effective way for
Technology to enforce its non-disclosure agreement is to prevent Jane
from working for Telecom. Neither Jane nor Telecom can cover the po-
tential legal expenses, so Jane remains at Technology. Although Jane did
not sign a non-compete clause, Technology has effectively prevented her
from working for a competitor.
This scenario describes the application of the inevitable disclosure doc-
trine. Allowing employers to restrain their workers seems to contradict
our modern economy's goal of the free movement of workers and capital.
But employers have been using this theory to do just that. By insisting
that workers will compromise their trade secrets and cause them irrepara-
ble harm, employers are convincing courts to enjoin their former employ-
ees from working for competitors. Whereas this rationale began with
technical workers such as engineers, its application has expanded to in-
clude employees with knowledge of strategic and marketing plans. Some
companies have exploited this expansion by retaining employees through
the mere threat of a lawsuit.1
Although many think inevitable disclosure makes employees inden-
tured servants, courts are increasingly relying on it to grant injunctive
relief. This comment presents a comprehensive overview of the doc-
trine's present application throughout the United States. First, it exam-
ines the doctrine's background, including its common law origins, its
rebirth after the PepsiCo decision, and its relationship to the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act ("UTSA"). Second, it analyzes individual states' treat-
ment of inevitable disclosure. The states are divided into four categories
1. See Jonathan Weil, Alcatel Unit is Quick to Sue Firms Hiring Its Employees, WALL
ST. J., June 21, 2000, at TI; Vikas Bajaj, Alcatel Guards Its Trade Secrets, DALLAS MORN-
ING NEWS, Sept. 3, 2000, at H1.
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according to the strength of their adoption, or rejection, of the theory.
Within each state, the relevant cases are examined to gain an understand-
ing of the present treatment of the doctrine and to predict its future
application.
In drawing a comparison between the states, it becomes apparent that
no two enforce the same version of inevitable disclosure. Courts call it by
different names, rely on it to enforce separate claims, and do not use a
standard set of criteria. This disparate treatment raises the question of
whether the inevitable disclosure doctrine actually exists. I believe that it
does, but it is not a doctrine in the traditional sense. Instead of analyzing
these cases against the uniform backdrop that a "doctrine" implies, courts
invoke inevitable disclosure as an equitable tool.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE HISTORY AND ORIGINS OF INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE
Inevitable disclosure is rooted in the fundamental principles of trade
secret law. In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Powers Film Products, Inc.,2 the
plaintiff sought to enforce a non-compete agreement prohibiting its em-
ployee from working for a competitor because of the danger of trade se-
cret disclosure. While the trial court denied relief because of public
policy concerns, 3 the appellate court reversed and enforced a temporary
injunction. The Kodak court considered the enforcement of less restric-
tive relief, such as a non-disclosure agreement, ineffective. Since "[t]he
mere rendition of the service along the lines of [employee's] training
would almost necessarily impart such knowledge to some degree,"' 4 the
court believed Kodak would be irreparably harmed. 5
Injunctive relief was enforced in the absence of a restrictive covenant
in B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth.6 The court granted the plaintiff's
injunction preventing its employee from working for a competitor based
on equity and the confidential relationship between employer and em-
ployee. 7 Since the employee's positions were similar and he seemed will-
ing to disclose the trade secrets, 8 the court believed there was a real
2. 179 N.Y.S. 325 (N.Y. App. Div. 1919).
3. Id. at 328 ("[c]ontract ... is void, as against public policy, in that it undoubtedly
restrains the liberty of the individual, and prevents his gaining a means of livelihood, ex-
cept in plaintiff's employ.").
4. Id. at 330.
5. Id.
6. 192 N.E.2d 99 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963).
7. Id. at 105.
It is a rule in equity jurisprudence that, if an employee gains knowledge of
his employer's trade secrets as a result of the confidential relationship ex-
isting between employer and employee, and, in violation of the confidence,
discloses such secrets to competitors after the termination of his employ-
ment, such abuse of confidence may be enjoined.
Id.
8. Id. at 104-05. Wohlgemeth said that "loyalty and ethics had their price ... Latex
was paying the price" and "he would expect to use all of the knowledge that he had to
[Latex's] benefit." Id. at 104.
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threat of disclosure.
The term "inevitable" was first used in E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co.
v. American Potash & Chemical Corp.9 Plaintiff's employee had not
signed a non-compete agreement, but the lower court enjoined him from
working for the defendant because of the possible breach of the em-
ployer/employee confidential relationship.10 On defendant's motion for
summary judgment, the chancery court concluded that inevitable disclo-
sure should be considered but declined to discuss whether it alone could
prove harm." Disagreeing with Potash's allegation that a finding of inev-
itable disclosure would merely be a "prophecy," E.I. duPont held that
"the degree of probability of disclosure, whether amounting to an inevita-
bility or not, is a relevant factor to be considered in determining whether
a 'threat' of disclosure exists."'12
B. THE PEPSICO DECISION
Although inevitable disclosure enjoys a venerable history, the theory
experienced a renaissance after the Seventh Circuit's decision in PepsiCo,
Inc. v. Redmond.13 This resurgence can be explained by several factors.
First, PepsiCo analyzed inevitable disclosure under the statutory rule of
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act instead of under common law. Second,
the court applied the theory to a non-technical employee working in a
non-technical field. Third, it established a standard for evaluating
whether inevitable disclosure existed.
PepsiCo began its analysis of trade secret misappropriation by ac-
knowledging the controlling force of the Illinois Trade Secrets Act
("ITSA"). 14 Adopted from the Uniform Trade Secrets Act,15 the ITSA
allowed injunctive relief for actual or threatened misappropriation.' 6 Al-
though little case law existed regarding proof of threatened misappropria-
tion, PepsiCo considered two cases which discussed the possibility of
inevitable disclosure. 17 The circuit court concluded that "a plaintiff may
9. 200 A.2d 428 (Del. Ch. 1964).
10. Id. at 429-32.
11. Id. at 432.
Plaintiff ... takes the basic position that proof of an inevitability of disclo-
sure arising from Hirsch's employment by Potash, without more, will warrant
the granting of the injunctive relief sought in this action .... The legal ques-
tion involved in this proposition is ... as complex as it is provocative, but it
need not be resolved now.
Id.
12. Id. at 436.
13. 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995).
14. Id. at 1267.
15. See discussion infra notes 25-30.
16. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1065/3-3(a) (West 1993).
17. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1268-69 (discussing Teradyne, Inc. v. Clear Communications
Corp., 707 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ill. 1989); AMP Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199 (7th Cir.
1987)). Teradyne held that "[t]hreatened misappropriation can be enjoined under Illinois
law [if there is a] high degree of probability of inevitable and immediate.., use of... trade
secrets." Teradyne, 707 F. Supp. at 356-57 (internal citations omitted). AMP recognized
the possibility of inevitable disclosure, but required more than proof that an employee
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prove a claim of trade secret misappropriation by demonstrating that de-
fendant's new employment will inevitably lead him to rely on the plain-
tiff's trade secrets. 18 Since PepsiCo was one of the first cases to interpret
the UTSA, other jurisdictions looked to it for guidance. Thus, the Pep-
siCo court's interpretation of the UTSA and its proof required for
threatened misappropriation became instructive for most jurisdictions.
Second, the PepsiCo court's application of inevitable disclosure was un-
usually expansive. The theory was traditionally applied to prevent a
highly skilled employee in a technical industry from working for a com-
petitor.19 But PepsiCo sought to enjoin its business manager responsible
for marketing plans.20 Unlike production specifications, business plans
and strategies are usually considered general information applicable to
many industries. And while soft-drink manufacturing involves some
technical processes, PepsiCo dealt with more non-technical issues like dis-
tribution and marketing. This expansion of inevitable disclosure allowed
companies not formally considered "technical" to utilize the theory.
Finally, PepsiCo clearly established elements for inevitable disclosure,
which gave other courts a standard by which to measure their own appli-
cation. First, the employee must possess "extensive and intimate knowl-
edge."121 Second, the employee's positions must be so similar that he
would have to rely on the trade secrets to adequately perform his new
position.22 Third, lack of candor by the employee or new employer may
be proof of their willingness to exploit the secrets for their benefit.2 3 In
addition to setting forth positive factors, PepsiCo rejected two elements
advanced by the defendant. The court believed that the employee's lack
of candor negated the importance of his confidentiality agreement as well
as his assertion that he would not disclose the trade secrets.2 4
C. THE UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT
Trade secret law was traditionally reserved to the states. But uneven
development, the lack of commercial certainty and the omission of trade
secret law from the Second Restatement of Torts convinced the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws of the need for a
took a similar position with a competitor. AMP, 823 F.2d at 1207. Although AMP pre-
dated the ITSA, the court believed that AMP continued to reflect good law. PepsiCo, 54
F.3d at 1269.
18. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1269.
19. See Kodak, 179 N.Y.S. at 327-28 (film manufacturing); Goodrich, 192 N.E.2d at
101-03 (space suit design); E.I. duPont, 200 A.2d at 429 (titanium dioxide pigment
manufacturing).
20. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1265.
21. Id. at 1269.
22. Id. ("[U]nless [employee] possessed an uncanny ability to compartmentalize infor-
mation, he would necessarily be making decisions [at his new position] by relying on his
knowledge of [former employer's] trade secrets."). Id.
23. Id. at 1264 (the employee told PepsiCo that he was taking a different position with
a competitor).
24. Id. at 1270.
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uniform law in the late 1960s.25 The Conference approved the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act in 1979, and subsequent amendments in 1985.26 The
UTSA was designed to clarify definitions, set statutes of limitations and
codify case law for remedies.27 The injunction provision of the UTSA
provides that "[aIctual or threatened misappropriation may be
enjoined." '28
Forty-two states and the District of Columbia have adopted the UTSA
and its injunctive provision.29 The eight states that have not enacted the
UTSA are Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Penn-
sylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and Wyoming.30
III. INDIVIDUAL STATES' TREATMENT OF
INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE
A. STATES CLEARLY ADOPTING INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE
1. Arkansas
Arkansas's adoption of inevitable disclosure rests heavily on PepsiCo
and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. In Southwestern Energy Co. v. Eick-
enhorst,31 the court analyzed a trade secret misappropriation claim under
the Arkansas Trade Secrets Act, which contained the UTSA's injunctive
provision.32 Citing PepsiCo favorably, the court specified that disclosure
could be proven through reasonable inferences from circumstantial evi-
dence, but not by mere speculation. 33
The Arkansas Supreme Court expressly adopted the doctrine in Cardi-
nal Freight Carriers, Inc. v. J.B. Hunt Transportation Services, Inc. 34 Not-
ing that both the Illinois and Arkansas Trade Secrets Acts allowed
threatened misappropriation to be enjoined, the court recognized the ap-
plicability of inevitable disclosure to its situation.35 The injunction was
granted because the overlap in the employee's positions and Cardinal's
25. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 163 (Supp. 2000) (Prefatory Note).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(a) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 449 (1990).
29. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 163 (Supp. 2000) (Table of Jurisdictions
Wherein Act Has Been Adopted). See also ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-75-604(a) (Michie 1996);
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.2(a) (West 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 35-52(a) (1999); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, § 2002(a) (1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 688.003(1) (West 1990); 765 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 1065/3-3(a) (West 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-2-3-3(a) (Michie 1996); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 550.3(1) (West 1997); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.1903, Sec. 3(1) (West
Supp. 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325C.02(a) (West 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 417.455(1)
(West Supp. 2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1333.62(A) (Anderson Supp. 1999); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 13-24-3(1) (1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-337(A) (Michie 1998); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 19.108.020(1) (West 1999).
30. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 163 (Supp. 2000) (Table of Jurisdictions
Wherein Act Has Been Adopted).
31. 955 F. Supp. 1078 (W.D. Ark. 1997), affd, 175 F.3d 1025 (8th Cir. 1999).
32. Id. at 1083 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-75-604(a) (Michie 1996)).
33. Id. at 1085.
34. 987 S.W.2d 642 (Ark. 1999).
35. Id. at 646.
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willingness to exploit Hunt's trade secrets were "more than sufficient to
show a threatened or inevitable misappropriation of Hunt's trade
secrets."'36 Additionally, the court recognized that relief under the Ar-
kansas Trade Secrets Act was not conditional upon a non-compete
agreement. 37
The Arkansas Supreme Court subsequently reaffirmed its adoption of
the doctrine but did not apply it. In Bendinger v. Marshalltown Trowell
Co.,38 the lower court recognized the applicability of inevitable disclosure
but failed to find threatened misappropriation. 39 Held to a clearly erro-
neous standard, the supreme court examined the record and found no
error.40 But Bendinger emphasized public policy concerns, including the
fundamental right of an individual to choose his vocation. 41
Although Bendinger may cause doubts about Arkansas's future appli-
cation of inevitable disclosure, the factual differences between Cardinal
Freight and Bendinger support their different results. Not only has Ar-
kansas clearly adopted the doctrine and the PepsiCo court's factors, but it
also does not hesitate to apply it in the absence of a non-compete
agreement.
2. Delaware
Delaware's recognition of inevitable disclosure in E.I. duPont de
Nemours & Co. v. American Potash & Chemical Corp.42 has been upheld
by subsequent decisions. In American Totalisator Systems, Inc. v. Auto-
matic Totalisators (U.S.A.) Ltd.,43 the court relied on the theory to enjoin
plaintiff's employee from taking a similar position with the defendant.44
The court found E.L duPont to be a "strikingly similar situation" and
concluded that it "controls the present matter. 45
Delaware reaffirmed its position in American Hoechst Corp. v. Nuodex,
Inc. 46 Decided after the state's enactment of the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act, the court recognized that Delaware provided injunctive relief for
threatened misappropriation. 47 Citing E.I. duPont and American Total-
isator approvingly, American Hoechst confirmed that injunctive relief
36. Id. at 647.
37. Id. at 643 ("This court determined that a non-competition agreement was not a
prerequisite for the enjoinment of [defendant]."). Id.
38. 994 S.W.2d 468 (Ark. 1999).
39. Id. at 474 ("Recently, this court adopted the inevitable-disclosure rule in Cardinal
Freight Carriers."). Id.
40. Id. at 474-75. Kraft hired Bendinger because of his general knowledge about the
industry, his job at Kraft differed from his previous position at Marshalltown, and there
was no evidence of the parties' willingness to disclose trade secrets. Id.
41. Id. at 475.
42. 200 A.2d 428 (Del. Ch. 1964). See discussion supra notes 9-12.
43. Civ. A. No. 5562, 1978 WL 4479 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 1978).
44. Id. at *1.
45. Id. at *2-3.
46. No. 7950, 1985 WL 11563 (Del. Ch. Apr. 23, 1985).
47. Id. at *3 (citing 6 DEL. C. § 2002(a) (1999)).
SMU LAW REVIEW
could be granted even if actual disclosure had not been proven.48
Since Delaware's adoption of inevitable disclosure predated PepsiCo,
its version emphasizes different factors. The existence of a non-compete
agreement is irrelevant because Delaware considers the employer-em-
ployee relationship confidential and allows "equity [to] enjoin a
threatened breach."'49 This injunctive relief was affirmed by Delaware's
enactment of the UTSA. Delaware also removes the factor of employee
behavior by emphasizing the importance of the similarity between the
employee's positions.
3. Illinois
PepsiCo based its adoption of inevitable disclosure on Illinois law and
subsequent cases have upheld its expansive analysis. In Dulisse v. Park
International Corp.,50 the court discussed the theory under PepsiCo but
concluded "this is not a case where future misappropriation is inevita-
ble."' 51 This conclusion was puzzling given the court's finding of actual
misappropriation. 52
While Dulisse may have been troubling if it was the sole case decided
after PepsiCo, later cases have reaffirmed Illinois's adoption of inevitable
disclosure and expanded its application to other causes of action. In C&F
Packing Co. v. IBP, Inc.,53 the court allowed a competitor to be held lia-
ble through inevitable disclosure. 54 More importantly, C&F Packing per-
mitted the theory to prove the existence of a material fact to survive a
motion for summary judgment.55 In Strata Marketing, Inc. v. Murphy,56
the court allowed the plaintiff to rely on the doctrine to survive defen-
dant's motion to dismiss.57
Illinois has continued the expansive application of inevitable disclosure
begun in PepsiCo by extending the doctrine to additional causes of
action.
48. Id. The court held:
Injunctions have been granted to protect former employers when an em-
ployee has taken a job with a competitor, the nature of which will demand
that the employee disclose and use trade secrets of the former employer re-
gardless of the employee's intent to disclose or to make use of the trade
secrets.
Id.
49. Am. Totalisator, 1978 WL 4479, at *2.
50. No. 97 C 8018, 1998 WL 25158 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 9, 1998).
51. Id. at *4.
52. Id. at *3 (finding enough evidence to prove trade secret misappropriation where
competitor brought a product to market quickly, lied to Park about its plan to become a
competitor, and mailed marketing brochures to Park's customers).
53. No. 93 C 1601, 1998 WL 1147139 (N.D. I1l. Mar. 16, 1998).
54. Id. at *7 ("a party may be held liable for the misappropriation of a trade secret as a
consequence of hiring a competitor's employee and placing that employee in a position
that would result in the inevitable disclosure or use of the trade secret").
55. Id. at *9 ("the evidence is, when viewed in light of the teachings of PepsiCo regard-
ing the inevitability of disclosure ... sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact").
56. No. 1-99-2749, 2000 WL 1800474 (Ill. App. Ct. Dec. 6, 2000).
57. Id. at *13.
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4. Minnesota
Recognizing inevitable disclosure before its enactment of the UTSA or
PepsiCo, Minnesota has continued to apply the doctrine. In Surgidev
Corp. v. Eye Technology, Inc.,58 the district court allowed disclosure to be
proven by "a high degree of probability of inevitable disclosure. '59 How-
ever, since proof of actual misappropriation existed, there was no need to
rely on inevitable disclosure to prove threatened misappropriation. 60
The factors necessary to prove disclosure under Surgidev were later
established by IBM Corp. v. Seagate Technology, Inc.61 The court held
that it required more than proof of an employee "possessing trade secrets
and holding a comparable position with a competitor. '62 To prevail on
injunctive relief, a "substantial threat of impending injury" 63 must exist.
These factors were met in La Calhene, Inc. v. Spolyar,64 which relied
on inevitable disclosure to enforce a non-compete agreement. Compar-
ing its facts to PepsiCo, the court found strong similarities in the employ-
ees' high-level positions and knowledge of company trade secrets. 65 This
"intimate knowledge" of the plaintiff's business practices convinced the
court to grant injunctive relief although there was no evidence of the em-
ployee's intent to disclose information. 66
Minnesota has continued to emphasize the importance of an em-
ployee's intimate knowledge. In Lexis-Nexis v. Beer,67 the court denied
plaintiff's injunctive relief because "[the employee] did not have the kind
of intimate familiarity with corporate policies and strategies" as in Pep-
siCo.68 Although the employee lied about his new position, the court did
not consider his misconduct relevant. 69
While Minnesota consistently applies inevitable disclosure, its analysis
differs slightly from PepsiCo. Both La Calhene and Lexis-Nexis turned
on whether the employee possessed "intimate familiarity" with the for-
mer employer's practices and trade secrets. Additionally, Minnesota
does not require evidence of employee misconduct. But the existence of
a non-compete agreement plays a more important role. The court
granted injunctive relief in La Calhene to enforce a previous agreement,
58. 648 F. Supp. 661 (D. Minn. 1986).
59. Id. at 695. Surgidev considered its trade secret analysis applicable to California
since both California and Minnesota have adopted the UTSA. Id. at 679-80. See Califor-
nia discussion infra notes 232-58.
60. Id.
61. 941 F. Supp. 98 (D. Minn. 1992).
62. Id. at 101.
63. Id.
64. 938 F. Supp. 523 (W.D. Wis. 1996). The trade secret misappropriation claim in La
Calhene is based on the Minnesota Trade Secrets Act. Id. at 528-29.
65. Id. at 531.
66. Id.
67. 41 F. Supp. 2d 950 (D. Minn. 1999).
68. Id. at 959.
69. Id. at 952.
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but did not grant relief in IBM in the absence of a non-compete. 70
5. New Jersey
Although an early New Jersey case appeared to reject inevitable disclo-
sure, it was clearly adopted by a later decision. In Continental Group,
Inc. v. Amoco Chemicals Corp.,71 the court held inevitable disclosure did
not prove the requisite level of harm for injunctive relief.72 The lower
court had recognized that Continental Group would suffer irreparable
harm regardless of whether its secrets were disclosed intentionally or in-
advertently. 73 Disagreeing, the appellate court distinguished its situation
both factually and legally from Continental Group, Inc. v. Kinsley,74
which had previously recognized inevitable disclosure.75 Since the New
Jersey standard for an injunction was "immediate irreparable injury" or
"a presently existing actual threat," Amoco did not believe inevitable dis-
closure was enough.76
However, New Jersey subsequently adopted the theory in National
Starch & Chemical Corp. v. Parker Chemical Corp.77 The court enjoined
plaintiff's former employee from working for a competitor although he
had signed a confidentiality agreement containing non-disclosure, but not
non-compete, provisions.78 Because of his extensive knowledge of plain-
tiff's business and development plans, the court found a "sufficient likeli-
hood of 'inevitable disclosure.'"79 There was no indication or discussion
of the employee's willingness to misappropriate the secrets.
New Jersey's adoption of inevitable disclosure is unrelated to PepsiCo
or the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.80 While its lack of case law makes
predictions uncertain, its application of the doctrine in the absence of a
non-compete in National Starch makes future applications likely.
6. Ohio
Ohio recognized inevitable disclosure before PepsiCo in Emery Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Cottier.81 Although the court could have enforced a non-
70. The court's refusal to enforce the agreement in Lexis-Nexis can be explained by
the lack of the employee's intimate knowledge.
71. 614 F.2d 351 (3d Cir. 1980).
72. Id. at 358.
73. Id.
74. 422 F. Supp. 838 (D. Conn. 1976). See discussion infra notes 155-57.
75. Amoco, 614 F.2d at 359 n.13 (Kinsley involved the technical expertise of an engi-
neer while Amoco involved a manager. Additionally, the issue in Kinsley was the risk of
disclosure if a non-compete agreement was not enforced, whereas Amoco involved the
probability of irreparable harm for a preliminary injunction.).
76. Id. at 359 (internal quotations omitted).
77. 530 A.2d 31 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987).
78. Id. at 32-33.
79. Id. at 33 (quoting E.I. duPont, 200 A.2d at 436).
80. New Jersey has not enacted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. See UNIF. TRADE
SECRETS Acr, 14 U.L.A. 163 (Supp. 2000) (Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has Been
Adopted).
81. 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 829 (S.D. Ohio 1978).
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disclosure agreement, it granted an injunction preventing the plaintiff's
employee from working for a competitor in the absence of a non-compete
agreement. 82 Emery analogized its situation to Allis-Chalmers Manufac-
turing Co. v. Continental Aviation & Engineering Corp.,83 and concluded
that disclosure was "inevitable and imminent" since the employee could
not work for the competitor without "giving [it] the benefit of plaintiff's
confidential information. 84
More recently, an Ohio appellate court relied on the theory to grant an
injunction in Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Stoneham.85 The trial court had
denied the injunction because the plaintiff failed to prove the requisite
imminent harm and "the inevitable disclosure rule did not apply to this
case."'86 The appellate court reversed. Although previous decisions had
not specifically relied on "inevitable disclosure," Proctor recognized that
non-compete agreements had been enforced under similar concepts.
87
Since the employee had "intimate knowledge" of the plaintiff's trade
secrets and his new position was in "direct competition," the court found
there was "not just a threat [but] a substantial probability" that trade
secrets would be disclosed.88
While Proctor did not explicitly adopt the doctrine of inevitable disclo-
sure, it clearly applied the same rationale. However, it is unclear if the
theory would be invoked in the absence of a non-compete agreement
since the court did not refer to the Emery decision, which did so.
7. Utah
Utah treated inevitable disclosure as a case of first impression in
Novell, Inc. v. Timpanogos Research Group, Inc.89 The court recognized
that states enacting the Uniform Trade Secrets Act had utilized the the-
ory to prove threatened disclosure. 90 Since Utah had adopted the
82. Id. at 835.
83. 255 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Mich. 1966). See discussion infra notes 106-09. The Emery
court felt that "Itihis case involves certainly the same situation." Emery, 202 U.S. P.O. at
835.
84. Id.
85. 747 N.E.2d 268 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000).
86. Id. at 278.
87. Id. The court stated:
In actions to enforce covenants not to compete, Ohio courts have held that
an actual threat of harm exists when an employee possesses knowledge of an
employer's trade secrets and begins working in a position that causes him or
her to compete directly with the former employer or the product line that the
employee formerly supported. Although the courts do not refer to this evi-
dentiary proposition as "inevitable use" or "inevitable disclosure," the con-
cepts are the same.
Id. (citations omitted).
88. Id. at 279-80.
89. 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1197 (Utah Dist. Ct. 1998). "No Utah appellate court has
considered, and thus no Utah appellate court has either adopted or rejected the application




UTSA,91 the court found "this case an excellent example of why it
should" adopt the doctrine.92 Novell believed that the similarity in the
employees' positions and their obvious desire to capitalize on plaintiff's
trade secrets made disclosure inevitable.93 The court granted injunctive
relief notwithstanding the absence of a non-compete agreement.94
The court was eager to apply inevitable disclosure in Novell, but it
failed to emphasize specific factors. While Utah's future treatment ap-
pears favorable, it is uncertain when the theory will be applied.
8. Washington
First applying inevitable disclosure in an unpublished opinion, Wash-
ington has recently reaffirmed its adoption of the doctrine. In Solutec
Corp. v. Agnew,95 the court relied on the theory to uphold an injunction.
Washington had enacted the UTSA,96 but contained no case law regard-
ing proof for threatened misappropriation. 97 Since PepsiCo "considered
an identical provision in the Illinois Trade Secrets Act," 98 Solutec utilized
its factors and found there was strong evidence of inevitable disclosure. 99
Three years later, Washington revisited the issue in Temco Metal Prod-
ucts v. GT Development Corp.100 The court granted the plaintiff's injunc-
tive relief based on "[the employee's] extensive knowledge of [plaintiff's]
products, and the limited endorsement by the Washington court of the
'inevitable disclosure' theory of trade secret misappropriation."' 01
Although Temco does not qualify "limited endorsement," Washing-
ton's treatment of inevitable disclosure appears favorable. The state has
twice relied on the doctrine and both Solutec and Temco have set forth
factors establishing the state's perimeters for the doctrine.
B. STATES LACKING DEFINITIVE CASE LAW
1. Indiana
Indiana addressed inevitable disclosure in Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v.
Lockhart,102 but did not rely on it to grant injunctive relief. Since Indiana
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1216.
93. Id. at 1217 (court characterized one of the employee's attitude as "predatory,"
since he "intended to take from Novell its trade secret and confidential technical informa-
tion and use it for himself."). The employees also retained confidential information. Id.
94. Novell, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1199.
95. No. 16105-6-111, 1997 Wash. App. LEXIS 2130 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 1997).
96. Id. at *8 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.108.020 (West 1999)).
97. Id. ("We did not find a Washington case directly on point.").
98. Id.
99. Id. (Agnew and Ingle planned to produce waxes. Since people with chemical de-
grees usually created the waxes and they were not chemists, it was likely that they would
rely on information learned at Solutec to produce their waxes.).
100. No. CIV. 99-755-KI, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6305 (D. Or. May 5, 2000). The defen-
dant was a Washington corporation and the case asserted a violation of the Washington
Uniform Trade Secrets Act. Id. at *3.
101. Id.
102. 5 F. Supp. 2d 667 (S.D. Ind. 1998).
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had enacted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, the court examined the the-
ory's applicability for proving threatened misappropriation. 10 3 Consider-
ing two cases which adopted the theory as "instructive,"' 0 4 it concluded
"neither case warrants a finding of inevitable disclosure on this re-
cord. '10 5 Although Bridgestone did not utilize the theory, its discussion
of its applicability makes future reliance likely. However, it is unclear
what factors would rise to the level of inevitable disclosure in Indiana.
2. Michigan
Although Michigan was one of the first states to recognize inevitable
disclosure, recent cases have declined to apply it. In Allis-Chalmers Man-
ufacturing Co. v. Continental Aviation & Engineering Corp.,106 the court
granted plaintiff's preliminary injunction enjoining an employee from
working for a competitor in the absence of a non-compete agreement.
Allis-Chalmers recognized the competing interests of employers and em-
ployees,10 7 but granted the injunction because of the "inevitable and im-
minent danger of disclosure. ' 10 8 The court believed that the employee
could not adequately perform his new job without relying on secrets
learned at his former employer. 0 9
Notwithstanding Allis-Chalmers, the court rejected plaintiff's use of in-
evitable disclosure to survive defendant's motion for summary judgment
in Hoskins Manufacturing Co. v. PMC Corp.110 Disclosure was not inevi-
table because the parties had different manufacturing technology that
rendered plaintiff's trade secrets useless and the information was general,
not specific."'
Michigan again declined to apply inevitable disclosure in Superior Con-
sultant Co. v. Bailey.1 12 The court recognized the UTSA's importance in
PepsiCo and its enactment by Michigan.1 13 But Superior distinguished its
103. Id. at 680 (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 24-2-3-1 et seq. (Michie 1996)).
104. Id. at 682 (discussing PepsiCo and Ackerman v. Kimball Int'l, Inc., 652 N.E.2d 507
(Ind. 1995)).
105. Id. (The employee in Bridgestone had not obviously taken trade secrets as in Ack-
erman and did not have the level of managerial knowledge present in PepsiCo. There was
also no similarity between the employee's positions or evidence of a willingness to disclose
trade secrets in Bridgestone.).
106. 255 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
107. Id. at 652-53. The court stated:
[An individual has the right to change his employment for whatever reason
he wishes and the right to utilize his general skill, knowledge and experience
for the benefit of his employer .... At the other end of the spectrum is the
law of unfair competition, including trade secrets law, in which the courts
seek to enforce increasingly high standards of fairness or commercial moral-
ity and to protect the owner of information obtained through the ingenuity
and effort of its employees, and its expenditures of time and money.
Id.
108. Id. at 654.
109. Id.
110. 47 F. Supp. 2d 852, 857 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
111. Id. at 856-57.
112. No. 00-CV-73439, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13051 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 22, 2000).
113. Id. at *10.
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own situation and found no threatened misappropriation. 14 While these
factual differences are valid, the court's distinction between threatened
and inevitable misappropriation is troubling.1 15
Michigan has not formally rejected inevitable disclosure, but its treat-
ment of the theory raises doubts about its eventual adoption. Although
Allis-Chalmers supported the theory, Hoskins and Superior Consultant
readily distanced themselves from inevitable disclosure and PepsiCo.
3. Missouri
Missouri has addressed the issue of inevitable disclosure, but it has
never relied on it to grant injunctive relief. In Baxter International, Inc. v.
Morris,116 the court affirmed the lower court's decision denying enforce-
ment of a non-compete agreement. Although Baxter recognized that
Missouri allowed injunctive relief for future disclosure, 1 7 it did not find
the lower court's decision clearly erroneous.1 18
Missouri reached a similar conclusion in H&R Block Eastern Tax Ser-
vices, Inc. v. Enchura.119 The plaintiff argued that PepsiCo allowed in-
junctive relief if employees were exposed to trade secrets. 120
Disagreeing, H&R Block held that PepsiCo required a "demonstrated in-
evitability in combination with a finding that there is unwillingness to pre-
serve confidentiality."' 121 Since the employee's positions were sufficiently
different, disclosure was not inevitable so employee misconduct was
irrelevant. 22
While Missouri has adopted inevitable disclosure, it is uncertain when,
if ever, the doctrine will be applied. Baxter and H&R Block declined to
invoke the doctrine to enforce non-compete agreements, which is the
most prevalent use of the doctrine. Additionally, H&R Block voiced
public policy concerns and required evidence of misconduct.' 2 3
114. Id. at *11 (The employee's new position would not require the disclosure of trade
secrets, the companies were not direct competitors, and the court voiced public policy
concerns.).
115. Id. ("Superior has demonstrated a substantial likelihood that defendant Bailey
poses a threatened, but not inevitable, misappropriation of Superior's trade secrets and
confidential information."). Since inevitable disclosure is used to prove threatened misap-
propriation, it seems counterintuitive to find threatened misappropriation but not inevita-
ble disclosure.
116. 976 F.2d 1189 (8th Cir. 1992).
117. Id. at 1194 ("although a former employer is not required to await actual harm
before seeking relief, '[i]njunctive relief must be based on a real apprehension that future
acts are not just threatened but in all probability will be committed"') (quoting A.B.
Chance Co. v. Schmidt, 719 S.W.2d 854, 857 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)).
118. Id.
119. 122 F. Supp. 2d 1067 (W.D. Mo. 2000).
120. Id. at 1074.
121. Id. at 1075.
122. Id. (Plaintiff was not involved in creating the trade secret, information was not
easily memorized, and employee's new duties were different enough to not imply reliance
on the information.).
123. Id. at 1076 ("If [exposure to trade secrets] were all the proof that were necessary,
plaintiffs (and other employers) could achieve greater restrictions on former employees
than they could contract for explicitly.").
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4. Pennsylvania
The sole Pennsylvania case discussing inevitable disclosure has adopted
the doctrine. In Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Johnson,12 4 the court
upheld the lower court's injunction preventing plaintiff's former em-
ployee from taking a similar position with a direct competitor. 12 5 Penn-
sylvania law provided injunctive relief for trade secret protection in the
absence of a non-compete agreement. 12 6 The lower court granted the in-
junction because "[i]t would be impossible [for the employee] to perform
his managerial functions ... without drawing on the knowledge he pos-
sesses of [plaintiff's] confidential information."'21 7 Air Products rejected
defendant's attempt to limit inevitable disclosure to employees possessing
technical information, 128 but refused to adopt the term "inevitable.' 112 9
Predictions about Pennsylvania's future treatment of inevitable disclo-
sure are uncertain but appear favorable. Air Products's review was held
to a clearly erroneous standard,130 but the court thoroughly examined the
cases supporting the doctrine and considered Emery "persuasive.' 131
Additionally, Pennsylvania law allows for injunctive relief in the absence
of a restrictive covenant.
C. STATES ADOPTING A LIMITED VERSION OF
INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE
1. Connecticut
Connecticut has limited its use of inevitable disclosure to enforce non-
compete agreements. In Branson Ultrasonics Corp. v. Stratman,132 the
court utilized the theory to determine whether the enforcement of a non-
compete agreement would prevent irreparable harm to the employer. 133
124. 442 A.2d 1114 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982).
125. Id. at 1125.
126. Id. at 1120. The Air Products court held that:
Under Pennsylvania law, a person may be enjoined from engaging in em-
ployment or certain aspects of his employment where that employment is
likely to result in the disclosure of information, held secret by a former em-
ployer, of which the employee gained knowledge as a result of his former
employment situation.
Id.
127. Id. at 1122.
128. Id. at 1124 ("Under Pennsylvania decisional law, trade secrets need not be techni-
cal in nature.").
129. Air Products, 442 A.2d at 1124.
130. Id. (The appellate court was "unable to find that the trial court committed revers-
ible error.").
131. Id. at 1125.
132. 921 F. Supp. 909 (D. Conn. 1996).
133. Id. at 913-14. The court stated:
When, as here, a high degree of similarity between an employee's former and
current employment makes it likely that the former employer's trade secrets
and other confidential information will be used and disclosed by the em-
ployee in the course of his new work, enforcement of a covenant not to com-
pete is necessary to protect against such use and disclosure.
2002]
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Weighing the parties' interests, the court held that it was more detrimen-
tal for the employer to lose its trade secrets than for the former employee
to look for another job.134
Connecticut reaffirmed its application of inevitable disclosure in Aetna
Retirement Services, Inc. v. Hug.135 The court evaluated the reasonable-
ness of the employee's non-compete agreement by examining whether it
preserved the employer's competitive advantage. 136 Aetna found the
agreement reasonable because the employee was privy to confidential in-
formation that may not be protected by a non-disclosure agreement. 37
The employee's good intentions were irrelevant since his decisions "can-
not help but be informed by the framework and knowledge he gained in
his employment at Aetna.' 38
While Connecticut courts clearly invoke the theory to enforce non-
compete agreements, it is uncertain whether they will apply it in the ab-
sence of an agreement. Branson and Aetna do not specifically adopt Pep-
siCo's "doctrine" of inevitable disclosure nor do they acknowledge the
similarities between Connecticut's and Illinois's trade secret laws. Aetna
did, however, discuss PepsiCo's factors, and applied the theory in the ab-
sence of employee misconduct without emphasizing public policy
concerns.
2. Iowa
Iowa has only utilized the theory of inevitable disclosure to enforce
non-compete agreements. In Uncle B's Bakery, Inc. v. O'Rourke,139 the
court enjoined the plaintiff's employee from working for a competitor.'40
Recognizing that Iowa and Illinois had both enacted the UTSA, the court
in Uncle B's Bakery found PepsiCo to be the "same situation."u 41 Since
the employee would be unable to perform his job without drawing on his
previous experiences, 142 the court believed there was "a realistic threat of
inadvertent disclosure of trade secrets, and consequently a threat of irrep-
arable harm to Uncle B's Bakery."'1 43 There was no indication that the
employee or his new employer sought to use plaintiff's trade secrets to
their advantage.
Iowa reaffirmed its application of the theory to enforce a non-compete
in APAC Teleservices, Inc. v. McRae. 44 Although the plaintiff argued
134. Id. at 914.





139. 920 F. Supp. 1405 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
140. Id. at 1435.
141. Id. at 1436.
142. Id. at 1435.
143. Id.
144. 985 F. Supp. 852 (N.D. Iowa 1997).
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that the employee's dishonesty was enough proof for an injunction, 145 the
court disagreed and clarified that PepsiCo required untrustworthiness in
combination with "the demonstrated inevitability that [the employee]
would rely on ... trade secrets in his new job."'1 46
Iowa courts have only applied a limited version of inevitable disclosure
to enforce non-compete agreements but they may be willing to expand
their application since Uncle B's Bakery acknowledged the importance of
the UTSA and APAC relied heavily on PepsiCo's factors.
3. Massachusetts
Massachusetts has used the reasoning of inevitable disclosure to en-
force non-compete agreements. In C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Intoccia,147 the
court granted plaintiff's injunctive relief to enforce a non-compete
preventing an employee from working for a direct competitor. Bard de-
termined that the plaintiff had not unreasonably withheld its consent to
the employee's new position. 148 Since the employee "could not and did
not leave behind his special knowledge of plaintiff's operation," he "will
inevitably draw upon that knowledge" while working for the
competitor. 149
Massachusetts reiterated its use of inevitable disclosure in Marcam
Corp. v. Orchard.'50 The court enjoined plaintiff's employee from work-
ing for a competitor to enforce a non-compete agreement. 15 ' Notwith-
standing the employee's good intentions, Marcam decided "he will, as
[competitor's] employee inevitably, even if inadvertently, be influenced
by the knowledge he possesses of all aspects of [plaintiff's] development
efforts. "152
Massachusetts has not explicitly adopted a "doctrine" of inevitable dis-
closure, but it clearly uses the theory to enforce non-compete agree-
ments. It may eventually adopt a more expansive application since
injunctive relief has been justified in the absence of contractual agree-
ments based on the employer-employee relationship' 53 and for the pro-
tection of trade secrets. 154
145. Id. at 860 (APAC's position was "that McRae's untrustworthiness alone is enough
to find that he will inevitably disclose trade secrets.").
146. Id. at 861 (quoting PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1271) (internal quotations omitted).
147. Civ. A. No. 94-11568-Z, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15368 (D. Mass. Oct. 13, 1994).
148. Id. at *8.
149. Id. at *8-9.
150. 885 F. Supp. 294 (D. Mass. 1995).
151. Id. at 299.
152. Id. at 297.
153. See Campbell Soup Co. v. Giles, 47 F.3d 467, 470 n.4 (1st Cir. 1995) ("even in
absence of applicable contractual provision, departing employee may be enjoined from
using or disclosing confidential information entrusted to him during employment, based on
implied contract stemming from employer/employee relationship") (citing Jet Spray
Cooler, Inc. v. Crampton, 282 N.E.2d 921 (Mass. 1972)).




As one of the first states to recognize and apply inevitable disclosure,
New York has extensive case law discussing the issue. In Continental
Group, Inc. v. Kinsley, the court enforced a non-compete agreement
preventing the plaintiff's former engineer from working for a competi-
tor.155 Under New York law, non-compete agreements were enforceable
to prevent trade secret disclosure. 156 Although the companies used dif-
ferent technologies, the court concluded there was a strong likelihood of
"inadvertent" disclosure because they were producing identical
products. 157
Subsequent decisions expanded on Kinsley's rationale and used the ter-
minology of inevitable disclosure. In Business Intelligence Services, Inc. v.
Hudson,158 the court relied on the doctrine to enforce a non-compete
agreement that prevented plaintiff's senior programmer from working for
a direct competitor. There was no evidence of the employee's intent to
disclose secrets, but the court believed that "such disclosure is likely, if
not inevitable and inadvertent, if [she] commences employment with [the
competitor]. ' 159 Although the court recognized the employee's unfortu-
nate position, it felt the potential harm to the plaintiff outweighed any
detriment to her. 60
New York granted an injunction in the absence of a non-compete
agreement in Integrated Cash Management Services, Inc. v. Digital Trans-
actions, Inc.161 Plaintiff's former employees created a substantially simi-
lar software program when they went to work for a competitor. 162
Notwithstanding the defendants' good intentions, the court agreed with
the plaintiff that "it will be impossible for [the employees] to develop a
competing product for [their new employer] without dwelling upon
[their] experience in having done the same thing for [ICM]. ' 16 3
The former employee's behavior was an important consideration in en-
forcing a non-compete agreement in Monovis, Inc. v. Aquino.164 Al-
though the court could have enforced only a non-disclosure agreement, it
felt inevitable disclosure would render the relief meaningless. 165 Recog-
nizing that an injunction could be granted in the absence of employee
155. 422 F. Supp. 838 (D. Conn. 1976). Kinsley applied New York law since the non-
competition agreement was signed there. Id. at 843.
156. Id. at 844-45.
157. Id. at 845 ("Whatever variation there may be in techniques, there is a high risk that
in the course of working with the TPT process, Kinsley will, perhaps inadvertently, disclose
secret aspects of the Continental process.").
158. 580 F. Supp. 1068 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
159. Id. at 1072.
160. Id. at 1070, 1072 (referring to Hudson "as a pawn in the competition between BIS
and MTI" but concluding that "BIS will suffer irreparable harm ... because Hudson has
extensive knowledge").
161. 732 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
162. Id. at 372-75.
163. Id. at 378.
164. 905 F. Supp. 1205 (W.D.N.Y. 1994).
165. Id. at 1234.
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misconduct, 166 Monovis's doubts about the employees' willingness to
guard the secrets reinforced its decision to enjoin them from working for
a competitor. 167
New York specifically adopted the "doctrine" of inevitable disclosure
when it enforced a non-compete agreement in Lumex, Inc. v. High-
smith.168 Although the court believed the employee's good intentions,169
it felt disclosure was inevitable since he could not help but rely on infor-
mation learned while working for plaintiff to make his new employer
more competitive. 170 The injunction was reasonable because of the simi-
larity between the employee's positions and the degree of competition
between the companies.
Application of the doctrine was slightly narrowed when the court de-
nied injunctive relief in International Paper Co. v. Suwyn. 171 The district
court clarified that inevitable disclosure can be used to prove irreparable
harm for a preliminary injunction, but that harm must be proven.172
Even though International Paper emphasized that this requirement did
not contradict previous case law,' 73 it restricted the doctrine's use by es-
tablishing specific factors.1 74
The employee's attitude was not mentioned in International Paper but
was an important factor in Doubleclick, Inc. v. Henderson.175 The court
enforced a non-compete agreement because the "defendants' cavalier at-
titude toward their duties to their former employer ... gives rise to a
reasonable inference that they would use [plaintiff's] confidential infor-
mation against it."176 However, later courts have considered
DoubleClick as an anomaly because of the defendants' egregious con-
duct. 77 Notably, it is not recognized authority.
While early case law embraced inevitable disclosure, New York's most
recent decisions raise serious questions about its future application. In
EarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack, 78 the court reaffirmed the theory's ability to
prove irreparable harm, especially where the employee possessed techni-
166. Id. ("even assuming the best of good faith, it is doubtful whether Aquino could
completely divorce his knowledge of the trade secrets from any [competitive] work in
which he might engage").
167. Id.
168. 919 F. Supp. 624 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
169. Id. at 630 ("During his testimony the Court was impressed with Highsmith's
candor.").
170. Id. at 636.
171. 966 F. Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
172. Id. at 258-59.
173. Id. at 258.
174. Id. at 258-59 (factors included the industry involved, the competitor's level of tech-
nology, the product involved, and the employee's level of knowledge).
175. No. 116914/97, 1997 WL 731413 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 7, 1997) (not approved by
reporter of decisions for reporting in state reports).
176. Id. at *6.
177. Id. at *5. See discussion infra notes 180-82.
178. 71 F. Supp. 2d 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), remanded, 205 F.3d 1322 (2d Cir. 2000), affd,
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 11446 (2d Cir. May 18, 2000).
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cal information and left to work for a direct competitor. 179 Additionally,
the court acknowledged the doctrine's expansive application in PepsiCo
and Doubleclick.180 But EarthWeb distinguished its situation by noting
that New York had not enacted the UTSA,181 and that DoubleClick
rested on the defendants' misconduct.182 The court instead emphasized
the public policy concerns raised by inevitable disclosure and concluded
that it "treads an exceedingly narrow path through judicially disfavored
territory."'1 83 To navigate this territory, EarthWeb set forth factors to de-
termine "the rarest of cases" where inevitable disclosure should be
used.' 84 However, the court never analyzed its facts under these stan-
dards. Interpreting the doctrine as "a powerful weapon in the hands of
an employer" whose "application is fraught with hazards," the court re-
fused to apply it to grant injunctive relief. 85
Another New York district court emphasized public policy concerns in
denying plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction. In PSC, Inc. v.
Reiss, the plaintiff sought to enjoin its former salesman from working for
a competitor. 186 The district court acknowledged that inevitable disclo-
sure was applicable in these circumstances.1 87 Outlining the factors es-
tablished by EarthWeb, the court emphasized the public policy concerns
and refused to apply it for several reasons.1 88 First, the employee had not
signed a non-compete clause and "to grant the relief sought here would in
effect convert the confidentiality agreement into such a covenant."1 89
Second, the court did not want to hinder competition.190 Third, the em-
ployee was a salesman, and not a technical employee, so the court
doubted how much confidential information he really knew.191 PSC
179. Id. at 309.
180. Id. (recognizing PepsiCo as the "leading example" of this expansion).
181. Id. at 309 n.5.
182. Id. at 310.
183. EarthWeb, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 310.
184. Id. The court held that:
(1) the employers in question are direct competitors providing the same or
very similar products or services; (2) the employee's new position is nearly
identical to his old one, such that he could not reasonably be expected to
fulfill his new job responsibilities without utilizing the trade secrets of his
former employer; and (3) the trade secrets at issue are highly valuable to
both employers. Other case-specific factors such as the nature of the indus-
try and trade secrets should be considered as well.
Id.
185. Id. at 310-11 (The court asserted that inevitable disclosure caused a "shift in bar-
gaining power" between the employer and employee and declined to "re-write the parties'
employment agreement under the rubric of inevitable disclosure.").
186. 111 F. Supp. 2d 252 (W.D.N.Y. 2000).
187. Id. at 256. The two companies had originally collaborated on the development of
grocery store self-scanners but their relationship had turned competitive. The salesman
was directly involved in the scanner development plans. Id. at 254-55.
188. Id. ("the doctrine should be applied in only the rarest of cases ... application of
the inevitable-disclosure doctrine [is] fraught with hazards") (quoting EarthWeb, 71 F.
Supp. 2d at 310) (citations omitted).
189. Id. at 257.
190. Id.
191. PSC, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 257-58.
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never referenced nor distinguished PepsiCo, which also involved a non-
technical employee. Instead, the court stated that "many of the cases"
using the doctrine involved "employees who had expertise in highly tech-
nical industries." 192
New York seems to be turning away from an expansive use of inevita-
ble disclosure. Later cases, such as EarthWeb and PSC, emphasize public
policy concerns and are reluctant to award injunctive relief based on the
theory. While these two cases appear to be complete departures, they
only concern the theory's application in the absence of a non-compete
agreement. Hence, EarthWeb and PSC do not contradict the majority of
New York case law, since only Integrated Cash Management lacked a non-
compete agreement. However, EarthWeb's restriction of PepsiCo to
states adopting the UTSA and PSC's emphasis on technical employees
may prove more problematic.
5. North Carolina
North Carolina has been reluctant to adopt inevitable disclosure and
severely restricts its application. In Travenol Laboratories, Inc. v. Tur-
ner,193 the court refused to enjoin plaintiff's former manager from work-
ing for a competitor. Recognizing that inevitable disclosure may support
an injunction in other situations, Travenol did not believe the necessary
factors were present here. 194 Since the employee was a manager, the
court held that "mere employment by a competitor" was not enough to
presume inevitable disclosure. 195
This restrictive analysis continued in FMC Corp. v. Cyprus Foote Min-
eral Co.,1 9 6 where the court again refused to grant injunctive relief. Since
North Carolina's Trade Secrets Act provided injunctive relief for actual
or threatened misappropriation, 97 the plaintiff alleged inevitable disclo-
sure when its employee began working for a competitor. 98 Declining to
adopt the theory,199 Cyprus Foote reaffirmed Travenol's limited hold-
ing.200 The court was concerned that the doctrine's application would
harm an employee's right to seek employment.201
North Carolina restated its constrained version of inevitable disclosure
in Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd.20 2 Citing Travenol and PepsiCo as au-
thority, Glaxo described the doctrine as applicable when the employee
192. Id. (quoting Int'l Paper, 966 F. Supp. at 258) (citations omitted).
193. 228 S.E.2d 478 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976).
194. Id. at 484 (The court required evidence of the employee's technical knowledge or
willingness to disclose trade secrets or of the employer's lack of technology.).
195. Id. at 485.
196. 899 F. Supp. 1477 (W.D.N.C. 1995).
197. Id. at 1481 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-154(a) (1999)).
198. Id. at 1482.
199. Id. ("[e]ven assuming that North Carolina would recognize this so-called 'inevita-
ble discovery' doctrine").
200. Id. at 1483.
201. Id.
202. 931 F. Supp. 1280 (E.D.N.C. 1996).
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had "intimate expert knowledge" in a "narrow technological field. 203
By citing Travenol and PepsiCo together, the court made it appear that
North Carolina and Illinois similarly applied inevitable disclosure. But
Glaxo's description was actually more limited since PepsiCo involved a
manager in a non-technical industry.
Notwithstanding its prior restrictive case law, North Carolina adopted
the doctrine in Merck & Co. v. Lyon.204 When its employee left to work
for a competitor, the plaintiff sought injunctive relief based on inevitable
disclosure. The defendant countered that North Carolina had not
adopted the doctrine. 205 Merck disagreed and characterized previous de-
cisions as merely "reluctant. '20 6 But it acknowledged that "North Caro-
lina courts employ their own version of an 'inevitable disclosure rule"'
since Travenol's factors differ from PepsiCo.20 7 Under North Carolina's
version, the doctrine can be invoked in two situations. The first requires
evidence of the employee's or employer's misconduct, as established in
Travenol. The second permits injunctive relief "when the trade secret [is]
clearly established and the possibility of disclosure high" but does not
require evidence of misconduct.20 8
North Carolina continues to apply a limited version of inevitable dis-
closure. Although its factors are more stringent than PepsiCo's, Merck
demonstrated the viability of the North Carolina version by invoking it in
the absence of a non-compete agreement.
6. Texas
Although threatened misappropriation is not statutorily protected,
Texas case law has frequently relied on a version of inevitable disclosure
to grant injunctive relief. In Electronic Data Systems Corp. v. Powell,20 9
the court overturned the lower court's refusal to enforce a non-compete
agreement preventing the plaintiff's former systems engineer from work-
ing for a competitor.210 Enforcing only the non-disclosure provision was
"insufficient," since "a former technical or 'creative' employee such as
[this] working for [such] a competitor can hardly prevent his knowledge
or [plaintiff's] confidential methods from showing up in his work."' 211 The
employee's intent was irrelevant since he could not adequately perform
his new job without relying on information learned at his previous job.212
Injunctive relief was granted again to enforce a non-compete agree-
203. Id. at 1303.
204. 941 F. Supp. 1443 (M.D.N.C. 1996).
205. Id. at 1458 (citing Cyprus Foote, 899 F. Supp. at 1477; Union Carbide Corp. v.
Sunox, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 224 (W.D.N.C. 1984); and Travenol, 228 S.E.2d at 478).
206. Id. ("These cases do not support Glaxo's argument. They do show that the courts
are reluctant to grant an injunction that will prevent a person from earning a livelihood.").
207. Id. at 1459.
208. Id. at 1460-61.
209. 524 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).




2002] APPLICATION OF INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE 643
ment in Weed Eater, Inc. v. Dowling.213 The court examined whether the
"restraint placed upon the employee [was] necessary for the protection of
the [employer]" and not unduly burdensome for the employee.214 An
injunction was appropriate since the employee could not help but rely on
plaintiff's confidential information in his new position.215 Additionally,
the court recognized that injunctive relief could be granted in the absence
of a non-compete agreement based on the confidential relationship be-
tween employer and employee. 216 The Fifth Circuit relied on Weed Eater
to grant injunctive relief in FMC Corp. v. Varco International, Inc.217
Subsequently, Varco was cited for holding that irreparable harm could be
proven by "uncontradicted evidence . . . that a former employee [was]
working for a direct competitor. '218
Although no case has yet used the term "inevitable," the court came
closest in Rugen v. Interactive Business Systems, Inc.219 When defen-
dant's former employee started a competing company, 220 the court
granted injunctive relief enforcing her non-compete agreement because
"it [was] probable" that she would disclose the trade secrets.221 Rugen's
analysis was later applied in the absence of a restrictive agreement in T-
N-T Motorsports, Inc. v. Hennessey Motorsports, Inc.2 2 2 As in Rugen, de-
fendant's former employees had started a competing company. 223 The
court granted injunctive relief because "it [was] likely [they] will use the
information to [defendant's] detriment. '224
Whether Texas has actually adopted a "doctrine" of inevitable disclo-
sure was recently discussed in the unpublished decision of Conley v. DSC
Communications Corp.225 The lower court granted defendant's injunc-
tion preventing its former employee from working for a competitor based
on the theory.226 Although the parties and the appellate court agreed
that Rugen was persuasive, they disagreed on the characterization of its
213. 562 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
214. Id. at 901.
215. Id. at 902.
216. Id at 901.
217. 677 F.2d 500, 504 (5th Cir. 1982).
218. Williams v. Compressor Eng'g Corp., 704 S.W.2d 469, 470-71 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
219. 864 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no writ).
220. Id. at 550.
221. Id. at 552 ("Under these circumstances, it is probable that Rugen will use the infor-
mation for her benefit and to the detriment of BS.").
222. 965 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no writ).
223. Id. at 20-21.
224. Id. at 24.
225. No. 05-98-01051-CV, 1999 WL 89955 (Tex. App.-Dallas, Feb. 24, 1999) (not des-
ignated for publication).
226. Id. at *1 ("the trial court found that Conley would 'inevitably disclose or use confi-
dential information and/or trade secrets of DSC in connection with his employment with
[A.FC]'").
SMU LAW REVIEW
ruling. 227 Conley reiterated Rugen's holding,228 but refused the parties'
invitation to attach the "inevitable disclosure" label.2 29 The court never-
theless analyzed its situation under factors substantially similar to those
examined under the doctrine and granted injunctive relief.230 Although
the court took pains to distance itself from inevitable disclosure, the dis-
sent recognized that invoking the doctrine's rationale was the same as
adopting the doctrine itself.231 While Conley's legal maneuvers are in-
triguing, they are not controlling because it cannot be cited as authority.
Texas has clearly adopted the theory, if not the terminology, of inevita-
ble disclosure. Notwithstanding Conley, there is a strong line of cases
utilizing the theory and expanding its application in the absence of non-
compete agreements.
D. STATES REJECTING INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE
1. California
California has a strong public policy favoring employee mobility and
voids most non-compete agreements.232 Since employers can use inevita-
ble disclosure to prevent their employees from working for a competitor,
California courts have been reluctant to embrace the theory. However,
California has adopted the injunctive provision of the UTSA. Five cases
discussing inevitable disclosure in 1999 highlight the difficulty in recon-
ciling the state's public policy favoring employees with the protection of
employer's trade secrets.
First, in Danjaq, LLC v. Sony Corp.,233 the district court refused to
allow the plaintiff to rely on the theory to defeat the defendant's motion
for summary judgment. 234 The court specifically rejected the doctrine,
holding that "PepsiCo is not the law of the State of California or the
Ninth Circuit. '235 However, the court neglected to mention that Danjaq
dealt with summary judgment while PepsiCo involved injunctive relief.
A Texas federal district court next analyzed inevitable disclosure under
227. Id. at *34.
228. Id. at *3 ("a former employee may be enjoined from using or disclosing the former
employer's confidential or proprietary information if the employee is in a situation where
use or disclosure is probable").
229. Id. at *3.4 ("We found no Texas case referring to a 'doctrine of inevitable disclo-
sure' . . . Contrary to the parties' arguments, this Court did not recognize a 'doctrine of
inevitable disclosure' in Rugen.").
230. Id. at *4-5 (including employee's misconduct, employer's need for confidential in-
formation, similarity between employee's positions, and existence of a non-compete agree-
ment). The court considered efforts by the new employer to protect the trade secrets
irrelevant since it was "little better than asking the fox to guard the henhouse." Id. at *6.
231. Id. at *11 (James, J., dissenting) ("[b]ecause I do not accept the concept or doc-
trine of inevitable disclosure").
232. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2001). "Except as provided in this
chapter, every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession,
trade or business of any kind is to that extent void." Id.
233. No. CV 97-8414-ER (MCX), 1999 WL 317629 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 1999).
234. Id. at *1.
235. Id. at *1 n.l.
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California law in Maxxim Medical, Inc. v. Michelson.236 The Texas court
predicted that California would adopt the theory and granted a prelimi-
nary injunction enforcing a non-compete agreement. 237 Recognizing that
California had adopted the UTSA, the court looked to PepsiCo since Cal-
ifornia and Illinois trade secret statutes were identical. 238 Maxxim ex-
amined the relevant factors and concluded that they "weigh heavily in
favor of a finding of inevitable disclosure. '239 Although Maxxim was
merely persuasive for California courts, its authority was undermined
when the Fifth Circuit subsequently reversed it without comment.240
Despite Maxxim's prediction, California reaffirmed its rejection of in-
evitable disclosure in Computer Sciences Corp. v. Computer Associates
International, Inc.2 4 1 The plaintiff pled inevitable disclosure to survive
defendant's motion for summary judgment.242 After recognizing that the
doctrine was "not the law of the State of California,"2 43 the court dis-
missed the majority of the cases cited by the plaintiff, since they involved
injunctive relief.244 But in so doing, it recognized the potential applicabil-
ity of C&F Packing Co. v. IBP, Inc.,245 which allowed inevitable disclo-
sure to be used to "raise a genuine issue of material fact" necessary for
summary judgment.2 46
California revisited the theory's applicability for injunctive relief in
Bayer Corp. v. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc. 247 Noting California's en-
actment of the UTSA,248 Bayer examined several cases which had estab-
lished factors for the doctrine. 249 But the court neither applied these
standards nor distinguished these cases to its situation.250 Instead, Bayer
236. 51 F. Supp. 2d 773 (S.D. Tex. 1999), rev'd without comment, 182 F.3d 915 (5th Cir.
1999). The court applied California law. Id. at 781.
237. Id. at 786. ("Although only a California Superior Court has had the opportunity to
determine whether to follow [PepsiCo], this Court believes that the California Supreme
Court would follow the overwhelming majority of other jurisdictions to do so."). Id.
238. Id. at 784 n.12 ("CAL. CIv. CODE § 3426.2 and 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1065/3(a) are
identical.").
239. Id. at 786-87. The factors included the trade secrets known by the employee, the
employee's position, the confidential agreement, similarities between the employee's posi-
tions, the employee's lack of candor, and the employee's removal of confidential informa-
tion. Id.
240. Maxxim Med., Inc. v. Michelson, 182 F.3d 915 (5th Cir. 1999).
241. No. CV 98-1374-WMB SHX, 1999 WL 675446 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 1999).
242. Id. at *15 (discussing PepsiCo, 54 F.3d 1262; Modern Controls, Inc. v. An-
dreadakis, 578 F.2d 1262, 1264 (8th Cir. 1978); Lumex, 919 F. Supp. 624; E.I. duPont, 200
A.2d 428).
243. Id. at *16 (quoting Danjaq, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1640 n.1) (internal quotations
omitted).
244. Id.
245. No. 93 C 1601, 1998 WL 1147139 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 1998). See discussion supra
notes 53-55.
246. Computer Sciences, 1999 WL 675446, at *16.
247. 72 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
248. Id. at 1116-17 (quoting CAL. CIv. CODE § 3426.2(a) (West 1997)).
249. Id. at 1117-19 (discussing PepsiCo, 54 F.2d at 1262; Merck, 941 F. Supp. at 1443;
Maxxim, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 773; and Surgidev, 648 F. Supp. at 695).
250. Id. at 1118. Bayer successfully distinguished Maxxim because it relied on a Califor-
nia Superior Court decision, which is not citable authority. But Bayer was unsuccessful
with Surgidev. First, the court said Surgidev did not "refer explicitly to a 'theory' or 'doc-
20021
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asserted that its situation was more similar to Danjaq and Computer Ser-
vices251 and reiterated that inevitable disclosure was not the law in Cali-
fornia.252 This conclusion failed to note a crucial difference: both Danjaq
and Computer Services involved summary judgment, whereas Bayer dealt
with injunctive relief. The court concluded that inevitable disclosure con-
tradicted California's strong public policy favoring employee mobility and
severely constrained its application. 253 Although Bayer's holding implies
situations where the theory may apply,254 its emphasis on public policy
raises serious doubts about any application of the doctrine.
The California Supreme Court's treatment of the fifth case highlights
the state's difficulty with inevitable disclosure. In Electro Optical Indus-
tries, Inc. v. White,255 the court affirmed the lower court's denial of an
injunction preventing an employee from working for a direct competitor.
But recognizing that California had not previously adopted inevitable dis-
closure, Electro Optical considered the rule "rooted in common sense"
and explicitly adopted it.256 Unusually, the California Supreme Court or-
dered Electro Optical unpublished six months later. Although the su-
preme court's rationale may have been unrelated to inevitable disclosure,
its decision rendered Electro Optical meaningless.
California's treatment of inevitable disclosure demonstrates the con-
flict between protecting employer's trade secrets and ensuring employee
mobility. Since California has a strong public policy favoring employees,
it has been reluctant to adopt the theory. Cases supporting inevitable
disclosure have been stripped of their authority while decisions opposing
the theory have been incorrectly applied. Bayer remains the definitive
California case specifically rejecting the doctrine's use for injunctive re-
lief, yet its analysis is flawed because it relies on Danjaq and Computer
Services and overlooks the significance of the UTSA. However, other
states applying California law have recognized the state's outright rejec-
tion of the doctrine and also refused to apply it.257 In addition, Califor-
trine' of inevitable disclosure" and was decided before PepsiCo. But Surgidev's reasoning
is substantially similar and the theory's origins pre-dated PepsiCo. Second, Bayer noted
that Surgidev did not rely on the theory since there was evidence of actual misappropria-
tion. Yet a theory does not cease to exist because it is not applicable in one situation.
Third, the court emphasized California's public policy favoring employee mobility. Since
law existed controlling trade secret misappropriation (the UTSA), public policy should be
a secondary concern, not the primary concern. Bayer did not try to distinguish PepsiCo or
Merck. Id.
251. Id. at 1119 (describing cases as "[m]ore on point").
252. Bayer, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 1119 (emphasis added).
253. Id. at 1120 ("To the extent that the theory of inevitable disclosure creates a de
facto covenant not to compete without a nontrivial showing of actual or threatened use or
disclosure, it is inconsistent with California policy and case law.").
254. Id. (inevitable disclosure could not be used unless there is a nontrivial violation).
255. 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 680 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (ordered not officially published by the
California Supreme Court, 2000 Cal. LEXIS 3536 Apr. 12, 2000).
256. Id. at 684 ("Although no California court has yet adopted it, the inevitable disclo-
sure rule is rooted in common sense and calls for a fact specific inquiry. We adopt the rule
here.").
257. See discussion infra notes 262-68.
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nia's strong interest in employee mobility has tipped the balance towards
the application of its law in a choice of law situation.2 58 Thus, California's
public policy is so strong that it has precluded application of inevitable
disclosure both in California courts and in other courts applying Califor-
nia law.
2. Florida
Florida recognized inevitable disclosure under the common law, but a
recent case raises doubts about the theory's application. In Fountain v.
Hudson Cush-N-Foam Corp.,259 the plaintiff sought to enforce its em-
ployee's non-disclosure and non-compete agreements.2 60 The court could
have enforced only the non-disclosure agreement, but it also prevented
the employee from working for a competitor. Citing Kodak, the court
said "it would seem logical to assume that [Fountain's] employment by a
competitor of the appellee would eventually result in a disclosure of this
information." 261
A recent federal case makes Florida's application of inevitable disclo-
sure appear dim. In Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co.,262
the plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction to prevent its former em-
ployee from working for a competitor in the absence of a non-compete
agreement. Although the parties invoked both Florida and California
law, the court held there was no conflict of law issue since both states had
adopted the UTSA provision for threatened misappropriation. 263 Thus,
the court's analysis applied equally to both states. Del Monte recognized
the viability of inevitable disclosure and acknowledged PepsiCo as the
"principal case. '2 64 But the court restricted its impact by holding that it
only applied in the absence of a non-compete agreement. 265 Since "this
case is governed either by Florida or California law, and these states have
not adopted the doctrine nor cited PepsiCo with approval," Del Monte
declined to apply inevitable disclosure.2 66 Whereas Florida had not yet
discussed the doctrine, California had definitely rejected it.2 67 Curiously,
Del Monte discussed threatened misappropriation and inevitable disclo-
sure as two separate claims, instead of recognizing inevitable disclosure as
a method of proving threatened misappropriation. Nevertheless, the
court discussed several factors supporting its rejection of the doctrine for
258. Globespan, Inc. v. O'Neill, 151 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (C.D. Cal. 2001). Since New
Jersey did not have a comparable statute to California's Section 16600 favoring employee
mobility, the court applied California law. Id. at 1234-35.
259. 122 So. 2d 232 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
260. Id. at 233.
261. Id. at 234.
262. 148 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
263. Id. at 1334.
264. Id. at 1336.
265. Id. (citing North Carolina and New York as the only jurisdictions following this
interpretation of PepsiCo).
266. Id. at 1337.
267. Del Monte, 148 F. Supp. 2d at 1336-37.
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the instant case.2 68
Subsequent Florida cases may be able to distinguish Del Monte be-
cause of its combined holding based on California law. If so, the factors
discussed by Del Monte parallel those of other jurisdictions. However,
the court's lack of reference to Fountain and strong language supporting
California's rejection make adoption of inevitable disclosure unlikely.
3. Virginia
Virginia rejected inevitable disclosure in Government Technology Ser-
vices, Inc. v. Intellisys Technology Corp.2 6 9 The court recognized that Vir-
ginia had adopted the UTSA,270 but refused to consider inevitable
disclosure as a means for proving threatened misappropriation. 271 Al-
though the decision contained no discussion or citations explaining the
court's rationale, its explicit rejection of the doctrine makes favorable
treatment unlikely.
E. ADDITIONAL STATES AND JURISDICTIONS
In 1999, the Practicing Law Institute ("PLI") published an excellent
overview of inevitable disclosure and cited twenty-one states as support-
ing it.272 This comment examines most of PLI's cases, but there are some
differences since PLI did not discuss states rejecting the doctrine. Addi-
tionally, some cases do not use the term "inevitable," so opinions can
differ over whether an individual case actually supports the doctrine. Ex-
amples of these differences include Kansas,2 73 Louisiana,2 74 and Wiscon-
sin.2 75 A recent law review article advocating South Carolina's adoption
268. Id. at 1339. Dr. Funk took no documents with him. Dole was aware of Dr. Funk's
confidentiality obligations to Del Monte and sought to preserve them. Dr. Funk's duties at
Dole differed from his duties at Del Monte. There was no evidence that Dr. Funk had
disclosed any confidential information or that he had any intention of doing so.
269. No. 160265, 1999 WL 1499548 (Va. Cir. Ct. Oct. 20, 1999).
270. Id. at *1 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-337(A) (Michie 1998)).
271. Id. ("Virginia does not recognize the inevitable disclosure doctrine.").
272. Stephen L. Sheinfeld & Jennifer M. Chow, Protecting Employer Secrets and the
"Doctrine of Inevitable Disclosure," 600 PLI/LIT 367, 411-22 (March 1999) (citing Arkan-
sas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachu-
setts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin).
273. Id. at 415 (citing Sprint Corp. v. Deangelo, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1188 (D. Kan. 1998)).
The plaintiff claimed that its former employee would "necessarily" utilize information
while working for a competitor. Sprint, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 1194. Although similar to Pep-
siCo, Sprint never referenced it or the theory of inevitable disclosure and held that irrepa-
rable harm was not proven. Sprint, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 1195.
274. Sheinfeld & Chow, supra note 272, at 415 (citing Standard Brands, Inc. v. Zumpe,
264 F. Supp. 254 (E.D. La. 1967)). But Standard Brands held that injunctive relief was not
possible for inevitable disclosure because of Louisiana's strong public policy favoring em-
ployees. Standard Brands, 264 F. Supp. at 265. Since Louisiana has since enacted the
UTSA, it is unclear how the doctrine would be treated today.
275. Sheinfeld & Chow, supra note 272, at 422 (citing La Calhene). The trade secrets
claim in La Calhene was decided under Minnesota law. See discussion supra notes 64-66.
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of inevitable disclosure also contains a survey of the doctrine.2 76
Since state law controls trade secret misappropriation, the majority of
cases examining inevitable disclosure have been state courts. But the
Fifth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits have specifically relied on the doc-
trine 277 and other circuit courts have upheld decisions relying on inevita-
ble disclosure.278
IV. CONCLUSION
To determine whether inevitable disclosure has emerged as a clear
"doctrine," presumptions regarding its fundamental elements must be
tested. First, PepsiCo relied on the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, so a
state's enactment of the Act should indicate its treatment of inevitable
disclosure. But this presumption fails because UTSA states have rejected
inevitable disclosure while non-UTSA states have adopted the theory.279
Second, PepsiCo enjoined a non-technical employee so other states
should apply inevitable disclosure in similar situations. Although some
courts have adopted PepsiCo's analysis, many criticize it as expansive and
only enjoin technical employees. Third, PepsiCo considered the em-
ployee's knowledge, the similarity in the employee's positions, and the
employee's lack of candor. While these factors appear frequently, they
have not formed the core elements of inevitable disclosure. Some courts
discard the employee's conduct while others require the existence of a
restrictive agreement. Since presumptions are difficult to make about the
elements of inevitable disclosure, the theory shares more characteristics
with an equitable tool than with a "doctrine."
However, the ephemeral nature of the theory does not hinder its appli-
cation. As with pornography, courts recognize inevitable disclosure when
they see it although they are unable to agree on its definition. Courts
have been using the legal reasoning underlying the theory for almost a
century, and they are likely to continue doing so.
276. Keith A. Roberson, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law: Employment Law:
South Carolina's Inevitable Adoption of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine: Balancing Pro-
tection of Trade Secrets with Freedom of Employment, 52 S.C. L. REV. 895 (2001).
277. For the Fifth Circuit, see Varco, 677 F.2d at 504. For the Seventh Circuit, see Pep-
siCo, 54 F.3d at 1272. For the Eighth Circuit, see Modern Controls, Inc. v. Andreadakis,
578 F.2d 1262, 1270 (8th Cir. 1978) (reversing lower court's denial of injunctive relief and
holding that potential disclosure should be examined when determining irreparable harm).
278. See Campbell Soup, 47 F.3d at 470 n.4 (1st Cir.); Amoco, 614 F.2d at 351 (3d Cir.).
279. California and Virginia have enacted the UTSA but rejected PepsiCo's interpreta-
tion. New Jersey and New York have not enacted the UTSA, but they have adopted inevi-
table disclosure.
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